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THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE REGIONALIZING ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY
JOEL B. EISEN†
Power transactions trading at lowest cost will eliminate certain environmental and renewable resources, which trade above the market
clearing power price, unless otherwise protected by government pol1
icy.

The invitation to this symposium prompted me to do some serious head scratching. Would I discuss whether “environmental regulations currently act as a barrier to entry in energy markets and whether
the current regime strikes the right balance between environmental
protection and efficiency”?2 In this time of massive uncertainty over
the future of “energy markets,” could environmental laws be the
roadblock to progress?
3
In my view and those of numerous others, progress toward
wholesale and retail markets (“restructuring”) has slowed through
poor design of the regulatory and technical infrastructure and the
4
combination of California, Enron, the uncertain future of FERC’s
Standard Market Design (“SMD”)5 and Wholesale Power Market
Platform (“WPMP”)6 proposals, states grappling with “stranded

† Professor of Law and Director, Robert R. Merhige, Jr. Center of Environmental Law,
University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks Anne Haith, Christina MacIsaac and
Heather Lyons for their invaluable research assistance.
1. Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning
the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
507, 523 (2004).
2. Letter from Allison H. Ridder, Special Projects Editor, Duke Environmental Law and
Policy Forum, to Joel B. Eisen 1 (June 17, 2004) (on file with Duke Environmental Law and
Policy Forum).
3. See generally 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
4. See generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B.
Rapoport and Bala G. Dharan eds., 2002).
5. Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452 (FERC proposed Aug. 29, 2002, to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
6. FED’L ENERGY REG. COMM’N, WHOLESALE POWER MARKET PLATFORM WHITE
PAPER (2003) available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/smd/white_paper.pdf.

295

081505 EISEN_FMT.DOC

296

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

11/14/2005 4:36 PM

[Vol. 15:295

costs” and other transition issues, and complex problems of market
structure and operation. Indeed, some of the same luminaries in the
field who are participants in this Symposium will be contributing papers to a symposium early next year on “Realizing the Promise of
Electric Deregulation.”7
Even those who haven’t yet given up on restructuring don’t put
much blame on environmental laws.8 But that hardly means that there
aren’t important environmental considerations in restructuring. In
this Article, I will address environmental issues in the context of our
rapidly evolving understanding of “restructuring.” The market for
electricity is fast becoming a series of regional marketplaces for
wholesale transactions, operating on bid-based systems that move
power at the lowest cost.9 There are plenty of states where power is
still delivered as it has been for decades: by “bundled” service pro10
vided by vertically integrated utilities. However, the trend is toward
regionalization, where independent entities control the transmission
grid and play a major role in determining how power is delivered.
These market participants, confusingly, have been known by a number of names and acronyms, though the most recent one is “regional
transmission organizations” (“RTOs”).11 The trend toward regional

7. 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV supra, note 3. My own essay will be titled Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric Utility Restructuring.
8. Richard J. Pierce, Environmental Regulation, Energy & Market Entry, 15 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167 (2005). In his upcoming essay, Realizing the Promise of Restructuring
the Electricity Market, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 3 (abstract available at SSRN Electronic Paper Collection, http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=585706 (last visited March
25th, 2005)), Professor Pierce argues that “the major political impediment to completion of the
restructuring process consists of a group of politically powerful electric utilities in the southeast
and northwest who have consistently opposed restructuring because they prefer the comfortable
and profitable life of an ineffectively-regulated monopolist to participation in a competitive
market.”
9. See, e.g., D. Mitchell McFarland et al., Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code
to Sale of Electric Power in the Wholesale Power Marketing Context, 21 CORP. COUNS. REV. 251,
256 (2002) (noting that, “Centralized power markets now exist in which suppliers may submit
bids to sell to regional markets and various trading hubs have emerged across the country trading power on a bilateral basis.”)
10. U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Information Admin., Map and Status of State Electric
Industry
Restructuring
Activity,
available
at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/restructure.pdf (last visited March 28, 2005)
(map showing that half of the states have not begin to restructure); Joseph P. Tomain, 2002 Energy Law Symposium: The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 438
(2002).
11. RTOs evolved from “ISOs” (Independent System Operators) in FERC’s Order No.
2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (June 6, 2000) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 35).
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marketplaces continues unabated, even in the face of uncertainty
about FERC regulatory efforts.12
Environmental laws are not nearly as important as other business
considerations in their impact on utilities’ decisions to pool their assets. That discussion centers largely on considerations that don’t have
much to do with environmental laws: whether the profit motive is
enough of an incentive for transmission firms to manage the grid
properly, ensure reliability, or build new capacity. There is an important set of environmental concerns in the transmission area involving
the ongoing controversy over the siting of new transmission lines. As
Professors Rossi and Pierce explain in depth in their articles, opponents of new projects can use state and local laws to delay or even
stop new transmission lines.13 So for the moment I will focus on a different intersection of environmental laws and a regionalizing industry: the impacts on generation of electricity.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS’ INFLUENCE ON GENERATION
The electricity system has three parts: generation, transmission
and distribution,14 though the delineations among the three are becoming less clear.15 Would there be more generators pouring their
power into the new regional markets but for environmental regulators and their insistence that pollution be controlled?
Undeniably, the environmental laws make it difficult for some
potential entrants in the generation business. A nuclear power plant
can take more than a decade to get from the drawing board to operation, and much of that time would be spent in mandated environ16
mental reviews. FERC has not seriously contemplated any new nu-

12. See Greg Edwards, Va. Power Tells SCC of Regional Grid’s Cost; Utility Says Joining is
a New Expense and Customers Who Will Benefit Should Pay, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Oct. 27, 2004, at C-1.
13. Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting in Deregulated Wholesale Power Markets: The CrossSound Cable As a Case Study of FERC’s Role Under Existing Law 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 315 (2005); Pierce, supra note 8.
14. See, e.g., Jeffery S. Dennis, Federalism, Electric Industry Restructuring, and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and State Restrictions on the Development
of Merchant Power Plants, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 615 (2003). Due to the high cost of establishing new, duplicative facilities, there is little chance of a movement toward free, unfettered competition in distribution.
15. See William Hogan, Market Power in Theory and Practice at 2, available at
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~whogan/powr0300.pdf (noting that “[t]he usual separation into
generation, transmission, and distribution is insufficient.”) (March 17, 2000).
16. Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221 (2005).
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clear plants since before I began law school in 1982.17 Some, of course,
might think of this as a salutary effect of environmental laws. Others
point to the difficulties associated with getting state-of-the-art natural
gas plants on line as evidence of a barrier to entry posed by the environmental laws, and it would be hard to argue that environmental re18
views have not played a part in that situation.
Professor David Spence mentions a pervasive fear that existed at
the outset of restructuring: that utilities operating dirtier coal-fired
power plants in a deregulated environment could sell their output nationwide, thus giving them an incentive to fire up antiquated plants
19
and increase air pollution and adverse environmental effects. The
utility industry has the doubly dubious distinction of being one of the
nation’s most significant polluters and one of the most consistent
avoiders, delayers, and subverters of enforcement.20 The loopholes,
intransigence of utility companies, and only moderately successful enforcement record have allowed utilities to operate in the shadow of
the law.21 Thus, it would be dangerous, frankly, to encourage utilities
to emit more pollution into the air without regard for the environmental consequences.
Restructuring may or may not have encouraged more pollution;
Professor Spence and others have some doubt about that.22 One reason restructuring took place in the first instance was a flood of new

17. Id.
18. One example I am familiar with is the protracted battle over a proposal by Tractebel, a
Houston-based energy company, to build a power plant near Leesburg, Virginia. Tractebel
withdrew its application after running into considerable opposition from local residents and the
public interest environmental group Piedmont Environmental Council. See Piedmont Environmental
Council,
Power
Plant
Campaign,
available
at
http://www.pecva.org/powerplants/tractebel.asp (last visited March 28, 2005); David Bradkey,
Tractebel ends plan to build in Loudoun, Loudoun Easterner, Feb. 27, 2002, available at
http://www.easterner.com/articles02/022702/content.htm.
19. David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187 (2005). See also NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, A
COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF U.S. ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING WITH POLICY OPTIONS FOR
THE FUTURE 65, available at http://www.ncouncil.org/restruc.pdf (June 2003).
20. In a recent issue of this journal, a Vermont Law School professor states that utilities
make up “an industry notorious for stonewalling air quality regulation.” Patrick Parenteau,
Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
363, 369 (2004).
21. See generally Joel B. Eisen, A Critique of the Regulations Revising the U.S. Clean Air
Act’s New Source Review Program, 13th World Clean Air and Environmental Protection Congress and Exhibition, London, United Kingdom (forthcoming Aug. 2004); Parenteau, supra note
20, at 375-78 (discussing NSR “myths and realities”).
22. Spence, supra note 19.
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generation entrants, spurred on by the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (“PURPA”) and Energy Policy Act of 1992 (“EPAct”), that
prompted FERC, Congress, and state legislatures to consider the
merits of industry-wide competition.23 A large number of natural gas
plants have come on line in the past decade, though the trend slowed
24
recently. If there has been any pervasive impact at all on new generation from environmental laws in restructuring, it may well have
been the salutary effect of marginally encouraging the switch from
dirtier fuels (principally coal) to relatively cleaner ones (principally
natural gas) among new entrants, though market conditions for basic
fuels are also important.25
Of course, the primary focus on the environmental impacts of
generation in a restructuring environment has been a nationwide debate over regulation of utilities under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).
As others and I have pointed out, the CAA New Source Review program has been a lightning rod of controversy and it is hard to imagine
that anyone today would seriously contend that it has achieved the
objective of controlling emissions from power plants.26 We have compelling evidence, of course, that it has been a major failure.27 While it
might be worth discussing replacing the existing system of regulation
in whole or part with a “second generation” technique such as a carbon tax or cap and trade system,28 this raises a complex set of issues
that would take us well beyond the focus of this Symposium.
II. “ENVIRONMENTAL” LAWS
PROMOTING RENEWABLE RESOURCES
I would like to focus on the “barrier to entry” question in another context, namely, governmental policies that promote market

23. Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Clifford S. Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: Will the
Electric Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring?, 25 Energy L.J. 113,
128 (2004).
24. See Justin M. Nesbit, Commerce Clause Implications of Massachusetts’ Attempt to Limit
the Importation of “Dirty” Power in the Looming Competitive Retail Market for Electricity Generation, 38 B.C.L. Rev. 811, 816-17 (1997) (crediting for restructuring the flood of new wholesale
generators resulting from PURPA and EPAct).
25. Id.
26. See Deepa Varadarajan, Billboards and Big Utilities: Borrowing Land-Use Concepts to
Regulate “Nonconforming” Sources Under the Clean Air Act, 112 Yale L.J. 2553, 2577 (2003)
(noting the deficiencies of New Source Review in raising standards for older sources).
27. See TOMAIN, supra note 16. See also supra text accompanying note 18.
28. One example is the Bush Administration’s controversial “Clear Skies Initiative.” See
Clear Skies, available at http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/ (last visited March 28, 2005).
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entry of renewable resources. In a regional electricity marketplace,
the market maker, not the government, presumably decides what
electricity gets made and to whom it is sold. Thus, critics have forcefully suggested for over a decade that regulatory devices introducing
non-market mechanisms conflict with the fundamental premise of deregulation, whether they are premised on environmental or any other
considerations.29
Speaking of a barrier to entry in this context is illuminating,
though probably not in the sense opponents of environmental
mechanisms have in mind. The most common “barrier” is that faced
by firms that use renewable resources to generate electricity. Wind
power is considered too intermittent to bring online; solar power is
30
not cost-effective, etc. A large array of tools and techniques exist to
promote renewable resources. These environmental mechanisms—
the “avoided cost” provision of PURPA or the production tax credit
for electricity generated from renewable resources, among others31—
endeavor to encourage entrants, not deter them.
There are numerous reasons to promote environmentally
friendly generation in a restructuring environment. It would reduce
air pollution; even assuming for the moment that traditional environmental regulation could internalize the harmful effects of air pollution from fossil fuel-fired plants, we have not accounted for potential advantages of renewable resources that produce no pollution at
all. Generating electricity from renewable resources would improve
32
our profile of greenhouse gas emissions. There are other advantages

29. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and
Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electric Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1341 (1993) (arguing that heavy governmental intervention that has characterized energy policy since inception is
no longer viable); Jerry Taylor & Peter VanDoren, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 422,
Evaluating the Case for Renewable Energy: Is Government Support Warranted?, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-422es.html (Jan. 10, 2002) (arguing that rationales for subsidies
promoting renewable energy are without sound economic basis).
30. See Kathleen C. Reilly, Global Benefits Versus Local Concerns: The Need for a Bird’s
Eye View of Nuclear Energy, 70 IND. L.J. 679, 699 (1995) (noting that many experts believe that
solar and wind power are unworkable).
31. See James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewal Resources, State Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 69, 72-78, 89 (2004) (explaining the intricacies of the production tax credit for electric power generated from renewable resources).
See also Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1914(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3020 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §45(c)(1992)).
32. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, Electricity Restructuring, available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/renewable_energy/page.cfm?pageID=92 (last visited March
28, 2005) (noting that “[e]lectricity generation is the source of 36% of the carbon dioxide contributing to global warming”).
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stemming from the fact that these facilities tend to be more decentralized than large conventional power plants. They reduce the risk of
33
terrorism-related disruption of the electricity supply. By being decentralized they also introduce a diversity in supply that might help
alleviate future shortages.
Thus, there seems to be an important role for environmental
mechanisms in a competitive environment. Some would disagree, often emphatically. In 1993, Professor Richard Pierce, a participant in
this Symposium, opposed ongoing efforts to integrate environmental
considerations in electricity restructuring through such devices as subsidies for energy-efficiency investments.34 At the time he saw two
competing revolutionary armies: swashbuckling free marketers attempting to make inroads in the Stalinist citadels of the electric utility
industry (who already had the proverbial nose under the camel’s tent
with the pro-competitive provisions of PURPA and the EPAct) and
environmental advocates who were trying to force their agenda
through anti-competitive behavior.35
Professor Pierce’s comments in 1993 reflected an important reality. As things stood then—and, as I will demonstrate, now—those trying to make electricity more environmentally friendly and those trying to make it more competitive could not easily coexist, if at all. Any
battle over a renewable portfolio standard or other “environmental”
provision pits crusaders for change (different kinds of change, to be
sure), each of whom has the fervent conviction that they are right,
against one another. It is a recipe for perpetual tension.
Dean Joseph Tomain, another of our Symposium participants,
has observed a fundamental disconnect between the “energy” world
36
and the “environmental” world. This is not surprising. Energy policy
is premised on developing and nurturing reliable sources of power to
accommodate growth and development; Environmental policy is
premised on preserving resources, and, most importantly, forcing decision makers to account for the full social cost of their actions.

33. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 518.
34. See Black & Pierce, supra note 29, at 1354 (arguing that “negawatt acquisition programs,” in which utilities subsidize investments by their customers that decrease customers’
electricity consumption, are generally not cost-effective and produce minimal environmental
gains).
35. Id. at 1361.
36. Joseph P. Tomain, 2002 Energy Law Symposium: The Past and Future of Electricity
Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 465-68 (2002).
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That has not deterred lawmakers from trying to make the industry more environmentally sensitive. In a recent article, my co-panelist
Steven Ferrey listed the following techniques:
1. System Benefits Charge/Renewable Trust Fund (a “tax or
surcharge mechanism for collecting funds from electric consumers, the proceeds of which could then support a range of
[environmentally-friendly] activities”);
2. Renewable resource portfolio requirements;
3. Siting reviews of new generation capacity (to interject an environmental component in siting reviews);
4. “Green” electricity pricing;
5. Promotional ratemaking policies (including, for example, net
metering);
6. Emission trading;
7. Emission taxes;
8. “Cleancos” (stand-alone companies promoting the commercialization of environmental technologies); and
37
9. Efficiency standards.
Some of these are in effect (renewable portfolio standards)38; Some of
39
these only exist in the realm of the hypothetical (emission taxes).
This limited progress should surprise no one familiar with Dean Tomain’s observation. There is an outright schism on the vital question
of whether environmental mechanisms should be employed at all in a
restructuring industry. One’s position depends almost entirely on
one’s initial assumptions. The environmental community takes it as a
given that promoting renewable resources in restructuring is necessary. Professor Ferrey, for example, devotes considerable thought to
assessing the likely effectiveness of these environmental mechanisms.40
To free marketers, competition is what matters, and environmental mechanisms are odious to it. Professor Pierce’s critique of
41
them in 1993 was especially deft. He acknowledged the externalities
of power generation, but nevertheless concluded that environmental

37. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 524 – 540.
38. See id. at 646 – 47 (noting that many states have adopted renewable resource portfolio
requirements as part of their electricity restructuring and deregulation statutes).
39. See id. at 537 – 38 (explaining how an emissions tax could allocate the cost of residual
pollution damages from their sources).
40. See generally id.
41. BLACK & PIERCE, supra note 29.
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mechanisms designed to internalize them were unwarranted as a form
of governmental intrusion in the market. He claimed other environmental regulation, specifically the CAA’s system of air pollution controls, would take care of the negative impacts of power generation.42
This might have made sense in 1993 but cannot be considered a definitive proposition today in light of the controversies of the past ten
years, given the considerable shortcomings of the current CAA regulation system. If second generation techniques such as cap-and-trade
systems found even wider use in the CAA environment, Professor
Pierce might have a stronger argument.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL MECHANISMS IN A REGIONAL MARKET
Defenders of environmental mechanisms have to come to grips
with a simple and compelling reality: the new ethic in the industry is
competition on a regional scale, not regulation. In the new utility industry, cost considerations are paramount. There is no better evidence of this than the impact of the transition to competition on
planning and demand-side management (“DSM”) programs. If utilities were to compete, there was no reason to saddle them with responsibility for these environmental programs, which would presumably be taken over by new entrants into the market. The
predictable result was a dramatic drop in DSM and integrated resource planning programs.43 Between 1993 and 1997, power companies discarded energy efficiency programs as anti-competitive, and investment in them fell by over 50% nationwide.44
Acknowledging the ascendancy of competition based on cost, to
what extent should environmental incentives be retained and for what
reasons? Viewing the situation through the lens of pure competition,
these incentives flunk the test of market friendliness. A production
tax credit gives a substantial boost to one type of producer (currently,
1.8¢/kWh45) that others do not receive. This is so un-market-like that
Adam Smith would roll over in his grave. As noted above, Professor
Pierce also argues that mechanisms relying on subsidies, unlike taxes
on polluters, tilt the playing field without even attempting to remedy

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1394 – 97.
NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, supra note 19, at 45.
Id.
Moeller, supra note 31, at 90.
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the underlying problem: the externalities of power generation.46 To an
economist, this is inexcusable.
But these arguments presuppose an ideal that does not exist: an
ethic of perfect competition. The reality on the ground is not yet and
cannot yet be so. Governmental intervention is a major component of
the advance toward competition, not its antithesis. And, critically,
that intervention already subsidizes one group: incumbent utilities
that have successfully argued for recouping their “stranded costs”
(costs incurred in a regulated universe that they might not recover in
a competitive environment). In my state of Virginia, for example, any
competitor—including, of course, a “green” generator—that wishes
to use the transmission lines of an incumbent utility will pay a “competitive transition” (or “wires”) charge to that utility.47 Of course, that
utility does not charge its customers the wires charge. With any new
entrant starting out at a competitive disadvantage, there are few of
them in the Virginia retail market. If that is not a barrier to entry, I
don’t know what is.
Environmental incentives should not be subordinated to a competition ethic until there is true “deregulation,” not “restructuring.”
The difference is hardly one of mere semantics. In this hybrid system,
there is little hard knowledge about what competition will bring, and
lots of lacunae, which force arguments to be made anew in state and
federal fora. The ideal of competition is years away. Market design
still has a long way to go before we have seamless, robust national
electricity markets. Until market monitoring can be done effectively,
which is at best debatable, it is hard to argue that open access for all
power generators on equal terms is achieved in practice. Transmission
asset owners still wield market power, which they can still use to deter
generation entrants. That is the barrier to entry we should be discussing; until there is true divestiture of the transmission infrastructure,
there will not be true deregulation of the industry. Hence, of course,
“restructuring.”
IV. HOW TO JUDGE UNDER INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY
Restructuring completely changes the nature of the electricity
transaction. RTOs operate regional markets designed to provide their

46. BLACK & PIERCE, supra note 29, at 1369 – 70.
47. See VA. STAT. ANN. § 56-583 (2004) (describing the “wires charge”).
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customers with electricity at the lowest cost.48 FERC’s Standard Market Design proposal adopted a variant of the “locational marginal
pricing” (“LMP”) model popularized by Harvard economics professor William Hogan and used by the PJM Interconnection RTO.49 An
LMP-based system can be extremely sophisticated (for example, it
can be split into day-ahead and spot markets), but its core principle is
quite simple: the marginal cost of moving electricity through each
node on the regional system reflects market conditions at that node.50
At any given moment, a renewable plant might not be the least expensive unit to dispatch on the regional system, for any of a variety of
reasons. As Professor Ferrey notes, “renewable technologies, because
of their unreliability, may be barred from bidding power to a power
exchange, . . . [or] may not emerge from a spot power pool system
that dispatches generation to operate based on least cost—although
many renewable technologies do have low marginal operating costs, if
not low capital costs.”51
Where free marketers see opportunity from institutional change,
52
environmentalists see danger. There are lots of uncertainties about
how these new electricity markets will operate. Of course, the shifting
sands of jurisdiction have an enormous impact. The long-established
distinction between sales at “wholesale” (regulated by the federal
government) and “retail” (regulated by the states) has been, of
course, the subject of considerable turmoil and controversy, not
ended at all by a Supreme Court decision on the matter.53 As I write
this article, for example, there is an ongoing debate in Virginia about
whether the state can regulate the extent to which an incumbent util48. See Hogan, supra note 15, at 5 – 7; Ferrey, supra note 1, at 634 – 35 (“This entity [the
regional system operator] may be quasi-public, in that it has voluntary rules for generating unit
dispatch and ramping. These rules can dispatch on a variety of protocols—essentially determined by the system operating rules and the related computer dispatch programs that drive and
control the system.”).
49. See Hogan, supra note 15.
50. Id.
51. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 635; see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, supra note 19,
at 65.
52. See, e.g., Environmental Public Interest Organization Comments on the Joint Petition
for Declaratory Order Regarding the Creation of a Northeast Regional Transmission
Organization,
FERC
Docket
No.
RT02-3-000,
available
at
http://nedri.raabassociates.org/Articles/Final%20Filed%20
Envir%20Comments%20on%20NERTO%2011-8-02.doc (Last visited March 28, 2005)
(hereinafter NERTO Environmental Comments) (outlining steps that the proposed NERTO
should take to incorporate environmental considerations in decisions).
53. See, e.g., Tomain, supra note 36, at 462 (“[t]he allocation of political authority is an
open issue.”).
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ity can recover the costs it incurs in joining an RTO. Not surprisingly,
the vanguard of litigation on the jurisdictional question was occupied
in large part by state public utility commissions concerned they would
lose traditional regulatory authority if their utilities joined RTOs.54 In
my home state of Virginia, this led to years of wrangling among the
utilities, state regulators, state legislators, and corporate and consumer groups about not only whether the utilities should join RTOs
but who was empowered to make those basic decisions.55
In the end, RTOs stand largely outside the purview of state public utility commissions, but are related to them in the sense that
wholesale transactions eventually lead to retail sales. As they grow,
this unique split of authority has led to uncertainty about institutional
leadership on many issues relating to the operation of these regional
marketplaces. Still, it seems inevitable that the future belongs to
RTOs or RTO-like markets, and the loss of regulatory jurisdiction
will cut in one direction: states ceding their traditional jurisdiction to
the federal government. In the new electricity market, there will be a
“larger share of wholesale transactions that will become federally,
rather than state, regulated.”56 The federal government, then, has a
larger role to play in making the industry environmentally sensitive.
FERC could require RTOs to incorporate environmental values in
pricing decisions, but it has not done so.57 Nor has Congress, which
has been slow to take to the notion of a federal renewable portfolio
58
standard.

54. Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, supra note 7 (describing as an example the litigation involving the utility American Electric Power and its attempts to join the PJM RTO).
55. In an upcoming article, Professor Pierce blames this sort of tactic for stopping progress
toward restructuring. See supra text accompanying note 13.
56. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 636.
57. Id. at 619 (“For renewables, FERC has not shown any inclination to grant a preferential price or rate for power procured from renewable resources.”).
58. Early versions of House Bill 6, the omnibus energy bill, would have created a federal
renewable portfolio standard, gradually increasing to 20% of power generated from renewables.
H.R. 6, 108th Cong. (2003). The RPS was left out of the final bill, which failed to become law in
any event. See E&E Publ’g, The 108th Congress Energy Bill, available at
http://www.eenews.net/sr_eb108.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). For a good description of how
the RPS wound up on the legislative cutting-room floor, see Stephen Polasky, Electricity Restructuring and the Environment, in PAINTING THE WHITE HOUSE GREEN: RATIONALIZING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 145 – 47 (Randall Lutter & Jason F. Shogren eds., 2004).
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V. WHAT SHOULD (AND CAN) STATES DO?
The states, fortunately, have not stood still. What we should be
doing, then, is discussing what role states’ environmental mechanisms
should play in a partially deregulated market, where full competition
is unlikely to occur for a while. For years to come we will have the
transitional conditions that exist now, with regional marketplaces
growing in number and scope and involving new players with unproven track records.
One could say the best response is to do nothing. In this view, if
it is in the best interest of the market, environmentally friendly firms
will prosper. This ignores the barriers to entry facing firms that would
provide electricity generated from renewable resources to regional
marketplaces. Moreover, it is not as if one set of players (environmental advocates, free marketers) has an entrenched position in this
discussion; Instead, both are scrambling to adjust to and have their
concerns addressed through continued governmental regulation in a
rapidly changing environment. A real problem, then, is that of making sure environmental concerns do not fall into a lacuna and vanish.
As the quote at the beginning of this article makes clear, generators using renewable resources are generally not price competitive
59
now if the sole focus is on costs. So the states’ actions should reflect
a core principle that generators using renewable resources bring a
wealth of benefits to the table that cannot be quantified solely by regional protocols for dispatching least-cost resources. States should
address this potential failure of the market (the narrow focus on cost
as reflected in current bids), and recognize that renewable energy facilities face the true barriers to entry.
Could a state directly influence the regional market? One of the
most obvious and visible means to do so is a renewable portfolio
standard (“RPS”). In its typical form, State X enacts a law that requires a certain percentage of power sold within the state by its utili60
ties to be generated from renewable resources. At present, fourteen

59. This leads opponents to attack RPS as costly, without acknowledging the
environmental benefits of electricity generated using renewable resources. See, e.g., Heritage
Foundation, The Senate-Passed Energy Bill Will Hurt Consumers, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Energyand Environment/BG1590.cfm (last visited March 28,
2005) (criticizing the Senate-passed RPS for increasing electricity costs to consumers).
60. See, e.g., Suedeen Kelly, NM PRC Issues New Proposal for Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), available at http://www.modrall.com/articles/article_110.html (2002) (describing the
proposed RPS in New Mexico). Suedeen Kelly is an attorney who later became FERC Commissioner, and is also a participant in this Symposium.
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states have some form of RPS.61 Numerous design issues are addressed differently in different states: what the percentage is (and
how it is set); which utilities are covered; which renewable resources
qualify; and so forth.62
An RPS is a market-friendly mechanism; In Professor Ferrey’s
words, “there is no government subsidy of any technology or project,
[and] the market dictates what renewable technologies and projects
63
are actually successful based on competition . . . .” An RPS does not
tax or subsidize any particular technology (thus avoiding the inefficiency of subsidies described above). It does not force a utility to use
any specific technology or, for that matter, to even generate power
with renewable resources. In many states, the utility can purchase certificates called “renewable energy certificates” (“RECs”) from other
generators instead of generating the power itself.64 The sale of RECs
by renewable suppliers can help make their power competitive on an
overall basis with power generated by fossil fuels. The power itself is
more expensive, and so selling it into a regional market might be uneconomic, but the separate sale of RECs makes up the difference (at
least in theory).
VI. WHAT CAN STATES DO (THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION)?
This last point requires us to consider how an RPS overlaps with
a regional marketplace. Even though it is a state standard, the RPS
65
“does not subsidize any particular . . . locus,” so generation can take
place anywhere. In fact, a state cannot allow only power generated
and sold within the state by in-state utilities to counts toward the renewables requirement. If it did so the RPS would clearly run afoul of
66
the dormant commerce clause. So in many cases, power generated
by renewables will come from out-of-state sources. Many utilities sub-

61. The Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE) maintains a list of
state incentives for renewable energy, including renewable portfolio standards. See
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited March 28, 2005).
62. NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, supra note 19, at 47 – 48.
63. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 531.
64. See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Renewable
Energy
Certificates:
Retail
Certificate
Products,
available
at
http://www.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/ markets/certificates.shtml?page=1 (last visited March
28, 2005). The European clearinghouse for RECs is the Renewable Energy Certificate System
(RECS). See http://www.recs.org (last visited March 28, 2005).
65. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 531.
66. Dennis, supra note 14, at 641 – 42 (listing the factors courts would use to invalidate this
“economic protectionism”).
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ject to a RPS also belong to an RTO into which they sell power.67
Keep in mind that electricity flows continuously throughout the large
regional grids like the proverbial water in the swimming pool, so it is
generated, flows onto the grid, joins other power, then is transmitted
to a retail seller (“load-serving entity” or “LSE,” in utility parlance)
68
at the other end of the transaction. That is, it flows throughout the
region.
Thus, state mandates have to mesh with the regional marketplaces in two senses: legally (fitting the new jurisdictional contours)
and operationally (addressing underlying market dynamics while allowing RTOs to integrate the mechanism functionally into their market-making activities). With respect to the jurisdictional question,
states retain their traditional right to regulate retail activities within
69
the state, including such matters as distribution companies’ conduct.
70
But a state cannot “reach back ‘upstream’” to regulate a wholesale
transaction, for example, by controlling an RTO’s pricing policy, even
if it believed it needed to do so in the name of environmental protection. As many have shown, there are Constitutional and statutory
problems with this.71
Is the requirement of a percentage of power generated from renewables a decision over which State X has jurisdiction, because it is
regulating the operations of a utility doing business in the state? Or is
it an impermissible restriction on wholesale transactions, because it is
constraining the RTO’s ability to decide which power is sold throughout a region? This is an open question; No court to date has tackled
67. Connecticut’s RPS, for instance, allows utilities to count toward the standard power
they purchase from qualifying renewable energy sources “within the jurisdiction of the regional
independent system operator,” in this case ISO-New England. See DSIRE, Connecticut Incentives
for
Renewable
Energy,
available
at
http://www.dsireusa.org/library/includes/map2.cfm?CurrentPageID=1&State=CT (last visited
March 28, 2005).
68. This is, of course, a very simplistic description of a very complex relationship. For example, PJM offers a course called “Load Serving Entity 201” that describes the complex relationship between the regional market and the load serving entity. Of particular interest is the
lengthy list of “Requirements of an LSE,” which describes the full range of interactions between
the
LSE
and
PJM.
See
Requirements
of
an
LSE,
available
at
http://www.pjm.com/services/courses/downloads/20040726-item3-requirements-of-an-lse.pdf
(last visited March 28, 2005).
69. See, e.g., Ferrey, supra note 1, at 637.
70. Id. at 637.
71. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, supra note 19, at 49; Dennis, supra note
14; Ferrey, supra note 1; see generally Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat
to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 243 (1999).
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the intersection of state and federal jurisdiction in the context of a renewable portfolio standard.72
The Federal Power Act, the touchstone of federal power over
the industry, defines electric energy transmitted in interstate commerce as energy “transmitted from a State and consumed at any point
outside thereof . . . .”73 This language “has consistently been found to
mean that FERC has jurisdiction when the system is interconnected
and capable of transmitting energy across the state boundary, even
though the contracting parties are in fact in one state. Similarly, the
transmission of power over a utility transmission grid used in interstate commerce is subject to FERC jurisdiction, even when all parties
to the transaction are located within the same state.”74 Therefore,
FERC has jurisdiction over the transmission facilities of an RTO, as
they are clearly used in interstate commerce.
However, that does not end the matter. States have not been
shut completely out of the jurisdictional mix, and retain their traditional authority over intrastate matters. This allows them to regulate
such matters as siting, feasibility determinations, plant operational
characteristics, and environmental compliance. In turn, this leads Professor Ferrey to conclude that if an RPS does not limit where the
power is generated, it would not pose an impermissible burden on in75
terstate commerce.
VII. DESIGNING A REGIONAL SYSTEM TO ACCOUNT
FOR A STATE RPS (OR, PERHAPS, A REGIONAL RPS)
How should a regional market be structured to allow a utility to
meet the relevant state RPS? 76 The operational aspects of this inquiry
are complex. It is impossible to “tag” a unit of electricity, so an LSE
cannot determine at any given moment whether the electricity it just
delivered was generated by a nuclear plant or a wind farm. Nor can
the RTO know the environmental attributes of the power it is transmitting about the grid, unless it has some form of accounting. And
then there’s the matter of the reckoning: how does the state know at
the end of the year that the utility has complied with the RPS?
72. Ferrey, supra note 1, at 645.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 824(c) (2000).
74. Steven Ferrey, Nothing But Net: Renewable Energy and the Environment, Midamerican
Legal Fictions, and Supremacy Doctrine, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 115 – 16 (2003)
(hereinafter Ferrey, Nothing But Net).
75. Id. at 115 – 16.
76. DSIRE, supra note 67.
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Tracking the attributes of a generator thus becomes paramount
in a regional system that seeks to promote utility compliance with a
77
state RPS. Some regions have made considerable progress toward
establishing a market for the attributes of electricity wholly separate
and independent from that for the electricity itself. The ISO-New
England RTO uses a Geographic Information System (“GIS”) to
track generator information.78 PJM Interconnection, the large RTO in
the Mid-Atlantic region, has developed a Generator Attribute Track79
ing System (“GATS” ) with a sophisticated design. In it, each generator would have an account into which certificates would be deposited as electricity was generated. These certificates would contain
relevant data about the nature of the generation (e.g., the fuel used).
LSEs would also have GATS accounts, and they would obtain certificates from PJM generators, who would have to sell or transfer certificates to them. At the end of the year, if the LSEs did not have certificates that matched their load served, they would be allocated them
from a “residual mix” pool of unsold and unused certificates.80 Once
all certificates had been allocated reports could be generated to de81
termine whether LSEs met the RPS requirements.
As PJM acknowledges, there are numerous reasons why this type
of system should be implemented on a regional basis, foremost
among them, of course, being that the market for electricity is quickly
82
becoming regional. The PJM GATS might work well in practice, as
would a similar system being planned for NYISO.83 The RTO (PJM)
generates information, which the LSEs then in turn use to convince
their individual state regulators that they meet the RPS (which of
course differs from state to state).

77. NERTO Environmental Comments, supra note 52 (noting that the design of a “superRTO” proposed for the Northeast should incorporate this type of system).
78. ISO New England, Generator Information Systems, available at http://www.iso-ne.com/
committees/generator_information_systems (last visited April 4, 2005).
79. See PJM Generator Attributes Tracking Sys. Working Group, GATS Concept (March
17,
2004),
available
at
http://www.pjm.com/committees/workinggroups/gats/download/20040401-draft-concept-paper.pdf.
80. Id. at 5 – 6.
81. Id. at 6 – 7.
82. Id. at 1.
83. See Initial Comments of the New York Independent System Operator at 7, New York
Pub.
Serv.
Comm’n
Case
03-E-0188
(2003),
available
at
http://www.nyiso.com/services/documents/ filings/sept_2003/nyiso_intl_cmmnts_rps_9_29_03.pdf
(last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (stating that, “The NYISO supports the development of a similar
system in New York and is working informally with Market Participants and vendors . . . to
attempt to develop the scope of a GATS requirement.”).
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A recent technical assistance report on New Jersey’s development of an RPS shows how complex the issues in this process can be.
Among other focuses of the report were the relationship between the
state RPS and the “much larger electricity market” (in this case,
PJM).84 The report recommended that New Jersey support the PJM
GATS program, and considered the following additional issues:
1. What power should count toward the RPS? As noted above,
Constitutional problems would arise if a state determined
that only in-state power would count. But could a state set
any limitations on power generated too remotely from the
85
state? Would it have to credit wind power generated in
North Dakota, for example?86 Would this issue have to be revisited if, as is the case at present, the regional market continued to expand?
2. If it is desirable that only power from “new” renewable facili87
ties counts toward the RPS, how should that be defined?
3. If other states in the region adopt RPS’s, would that lead toward a possible shortage of REC’s, and what would be done
to address this shortage? Should a state consider altering its
RPS in light of the actions of neighboring states that are also
88
part of the regional market?
4. If a shortage of credits persisted, could a utility satisfy its requirement through some sort of alternative mechanism such
as a payment into a state’s clean energy fund, or would this
89
have the effect of discouraging the market for green power?
5. Should the state have its own accounting system for REC’s or
should it simply rely on the regional one?90
Given that these regional markets are just getting underway in many
places, now is the time to discuss this important set of issues. Some
have even suggested converting the existing patchwork of state renewable portfolio standards to a smaller number of “regional portfo-

84. NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, REG’L ASSISTANCE PROJECT, TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE FOR THE NEW JERSEY RENEWABLE ENERGY TASK FORCE 4 – 5, available at
http://www.ncouncil.org/ rap.pdf (2003).
85. See id. at 4.
86. Id.
87. Id. The New Jersey report recommended that power count only from those renewable
facilities outside the PJM market that commenced construction on or after January 1, 2003.
88. Id at 5.
89. Id.
90. Id.at 6.
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lio standards.”91 It would require either voluntary agreement or federal regulation to implement a solution of this sort, so it is not surprising that the discussion to date involves cooperation between states
and regional markets. On the other hand, resolving all of these issues
on a regional basis may well be the kind of strategy that should be
employed to ensure environmental friendliness in an industry that is,
as noted above, fast becoming regional.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A former White House staffer and restructuring veteran recently
opined that, “[a]t first glance, deregulation issues do not seem to be
particularly relevant for environmental policy.”92 That’s because on
the surface, restructuring seems to be all about economics, and little
else. Still, environmental considerations are important, and the real
issue is to what extent they are protected (not thought of as an imposition) during this tectonic upheaval in the industry. Thus, I would ask
whether we should utilize laws we would describe as environmental,
for lack of a better term, to help entrants who will generate power using renewable resources.
Restructuring is nothing short of a complete reordering of the
famously staid electric utility industry. And, like other changes it introduces a host of uncertainty. The raison d’etre of restructuring is to
bring about free market-like competition in the industry. As a counterpoint to the inefficient regulatory regime of the past this may well
make sense, although the jury is still out and the promise of restructuring has not yet been fully capitalized upon in practice. But the goal
of restructuring is to allow free-wheeling (pardon the pun) competition without guarantees except that it will lower costs for end users of
electricity. Modern environmental regulation exists precisely because
concerned individuals, legislatures and judges thought it essential that
in these sorts of situations competitors should be reined in to control
environmental risks. In all such dynamics the quest of responsible environmental advocates is not to deny that a market mechanism can
work, but to make sure that the market mechanism captures the full
social cost of production in the price of electricity.
91. Regulators in New England have proposed that the entire region develop a collective
portfolio standard with tradable credits. See DSIRE, Maine Incentives for Renewable Energy,
available
at
http://www.dsireusa.org/library/includes/incentive2.cfm?Incentive_Code=ME01R&state=ME&
CurrentPageID=1 (last visited March 28, 2005).
92. Polasky, supra note 58, at 141.
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To categorize all environmental mechanisms as inefficient is to
deny the fundamental institutional responsibility of regional players
in electricity restructuring to ensure that environmental considerations survive the transition to competition. At the regional level,
promising initiatives are already underway to support market-friendly
mechanisms such as renewable portfolio standards. Still, there is a
long way to go before the states’ mandates and the new regional markets are effectively harmonized.

